Fragmentation and inter-judicial dialogue : the CJEU and the ICJ at the interface by KASSOTI, Eva
       
 
FRAGMENTATION AND INTER-JUDICIAL DIALOGUE: THE CJEU 
AND THE ICJ AT THE INTERFACE 
 
Eva Kassoti∗ 
 
 
This contribution explores the question whether the CJEU has promoted or, 
conversely, weakened the coherence of the international legal system through its 
practice within the broader context of the fragmentation debate. In order to do so, 
the article begins by inquiring into the notions of 'fragmentation' and 'coherence' and 
argues that the two terms are used to connote a wide array of meanings. Focusing on 
the judicial aspect, the article continues by examining the extent to which the CJEU 
is willing to engage with external sources by directly citing the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ in cases involving questions of public international law. It is demonstrated, 
that, in its practice, the Court shows a high degree of deference to the authority of the 
ICJ by routinely having recourse to the latter's case-law. In this light, the article 
puts into question the manner in which the EU courts are often portrayed in the 
literature: by refusing to make their own bold pronouncements on international law, 
the EU courts are actually conducive to the coherence of the international legal 
system. The article concludes by highlighting that, in order to remain informed and 
relevant, the fragmentation/coherence debate must also include the 'trans-judicial 
communication' perspective.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past decade, the question as to whether, and to what extent, 
international law is a fragmented legal order has been at the forefront of 
academic discourse. Irrespective of whether or not fragmentation actually 
exists (and if so, whether it is best perceived as a problem or as the natural 
outgrowth of a continuously evolving legal order) it remains true that the 
move from the half-century judicial monopoly of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) to its present co-existence with the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) raises a host of questions. The EU law's long-
standing claim to autonomy and its latest manifestations in the Kadi1 and 
Intertanko2 judgments have led a number of lawyers to vociferously criticise 
the Court for being an 'agent of dualism' – thereby endangering the 
coherence of the international legal order.3 Nevertheless, critics tend to 
focus on EU rhetoric and on particular judgments as proof of the EU's 
contribution to the fragmentation of the international legal order, while, at 
the same time, ignoring other judgments by the same Court that are 
undoubtedly 'international law friendly', such as Brita4 and ATAA.5 More 
fundamentally, the fragmentation narrative tends to overlook the existence 
and extent of judicial dialogue between the ICJ and the CJEU.  
 
In this light, the present article purports to revisit the question whether 
the EU Courts have promoted or weakened coherence in international law 
through their practice by exploring the place of the ICJ's case-law in the 
legal disputes of the EU. The article begins with some preliminary remarks 
on the relationship between EU and international law. It asserts that, 
although the interface between the two legal orders is not without 
problems, there are no irreconcilable, systemic differences between them. 
More particularly, it is shown that far from constituting a so-called 'self-
contained' regime, the EU shows a high degree of deference for 
international law. In this respect, it is argued that the EU law's claim to 
autonomy is not incompatible with the open-ended structure of the 
international legal system, which, due to its horizontal and decentralised 
nature, permits the development of highly specialised sub-systems.  
 
                                                
1 CJEU, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, C-595/10P European Commission v Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:518.  
2 CJEU, Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport 
[2008] ECR I-04057.   
3 See for example Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt, Thomas Ramopoulos 'Worlds Apart? 
Comparing the Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature 
to International Law' Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper 
No. 96 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274763 (accessed 31 
August 2015).  
4 CJEU, Case C-386/08 Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen [2010] ECR I-
01289.  
5 CJEU, Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] ECR I-13755.  
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The article continues by mapping out the debate on the fragmentation of 
international law, as this constitutes the broader problematique within 
which the question of coherence has been raised in recent years. It is 
shown that fragmentation has both normative (normative fragmentation) 
and institutional aspects (substantive fragmentation). The discussion 
focuses on the latter and substantive fragmentation is defined here as the 
increased risk of divergent interpretations of international law norms due 
to the recent proliferation of international courts and tribunals.  
 
Against this backdrop, the article zooms in on the notion of coherence and 
claims that, in the context of substantive fragmentation, coherence 
amounts to consistency of judicial reasoning, i.e. ascertaining whether the 
CJEU's reasoning is compatible with that of the ICJ in similar cases – 
irrespective of whether international law is given precedence in a given 
case or not. It is asserted that an important variable of adjudicative 
coherence is the extent to which the CJEU is cognizant of, and engages 
with, the case-law of the ICJ – since the latter remains the only judicial 
body with universal jurisdiction over all matters of international law. The 
article proceeds to examine the patterns of judicial dialogue between the 
two courts and argues that the CJEU's approach is much more conducive 
to the unity of the international legal order than it is given credit for. 
Here, the article identifies a number of areas where the CJEU makes 
copious references to the authority of the ICJ and demonstrates that, in 
recent years, the EU courts have been increasingly more receptive to 
external sources. At the same time, the paper exemplifies how the 
occasional reluctance of the CJEU to engage in depth with complex 
international law questions may undermine the quality of trans-judicial 
dialogue between the two courts. The article concludes by stressing the 
importance of adding the 'judicial dialogue' perspective to the on-going 
fragmentation debate. The coherence of the 'incorrigibly plural' world of 
international legal development cannot be assessed solely in terms of the 
traditional binaries of validity/invalidity; rather the level and extent of 
interaction among bodies embedded in different legal orders need to be 
also evaluated.  
 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EU LAW: SOME PRELIMINARY 
REMARKS 
 
Although the focus of the article is to examine the extent to which the ICJ 
and the CJEU engage in inter-judicial dialogue within the overall 
problématique of the so-called 'fragmentation' of the international legal 
order, it is helpful, from the outset, to offer some preliminary remarks on 
the relationship between international and EU law. This will provide some 
background to the discussion that will unfold in the following sections as 
well as clarify our own vantage point. It is a truism to say that the 
relationship between international law and EU law is complicated. 
However, it must be borne in mind that there is an inherent complexity in 
conceptualising the relationship between any two given legal orders – 
especially the relationship between a horizontal, decentralised legal order 
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with weak enforcement mechanisms (international law) and a highly 
integrated, multi-layered and developed legal order with strong 
enforcement mechanisms (EU law). The main point advocated in this 
section is that the level and extent of this complexity is perhaps over-
exaggerated: much depends on who is looking at the relationship and what 
they are exactly looking at. As a general rule, international lawyers tend to 
look at EU law merely as a sub-system of international law,6 while EU 
lawyers tend to stress the autonomous and sui generis nature of EU law and 
to overlook its links to general international law.7 However, as it will be 
shown below, once the debate moves from general theoretical points (and 
thus, beyond disciplinary biases) to the specifics, it becomes apparent that 
EU law poses little systemic threat to international law. More particularly, 
the section argues that: a) The EU does not exist in a systemic vacuum. On 
the contrary, both the EU Treaties and the practice of the CJEU reveal a 
large degree of Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit; and b) international law, due to its 
lack of vertical integration, is, by its very nature, amenable to the creation 
of leges speciales – without this endangering its integrity.  
 
First, any discussion involving questions of 'fragmentation of international 
law' presupposes the existence of an international legal system – however 
diffuse and decentralised that may be – the unity of which may (or may 
not) be threatened by the existence of specialised rules or by the practice 
of different actors and courts within that system.8 Thus, it is necessary to 
provide a rudimentary blueprint of the relationship between international 
and EU law in order to ascertain whether the latter constitutes a 'self-
contained' regime, namely a 'closed legal circuit' with a complete set of 
rules and, thus, no need to fall back on rules of general international law.9 
If EU law is indeed a self-contained regime, then this would render any 
                                                
6 See for example Daniel Bethlehem, 'International Law, Community Law, National 
Law: Three Systems in Search of a Framework', in Martti Koskenniemi (ed), 
International Law Aspects of the European Union (Kluwer Law 1998), 169, 178. 
7 See for example the statement by V. Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on State Responsibility): 'Generally, the 
specialists on Community law tended to consider that the system constituted a self-
contained regime. Whereas scholars of public international law shared a tendency to 
argue that treaties establishing the Community did not really differ from other 
treaties.' Summary Record of the 2266th meeting, Yrbk. of the ILC 1992, Vol. I, p 76, 
para 2. See also Joseph Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe' (1991) Yale Law 
Journal 2403, 2422; Leigh Hancher, 'Constitutionalism, the Community Court and 
International Law' (1994) NYIL 259, 265-266.  
8 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13/04/2006, 
(finalised by Martti Koskenniemi), para 15 
 http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf (accessed on 31 August 
2015), hereinafter referred to as the Report on Fragmentation.  
9 Bruno Simma, 'Self-Contained Regimes' (1985) NYIL 111. According to Simma, the 
term 'self-contained regimes' is used to 'designate a certain category of subsystems, 
namely those embracing, in principle, a full (exhaustive and definite) set of secondary 
rules.' ibid, at 115-116. For an overview of practice and literature pertaining to self-
contained regimes, see also the ILC's Report on Fragmentation (note 8), 65-100.  
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debate on points of convergence and divergence between EU and 
international law largely redundant: there is not much point in debating 
whether certain substantive or institutional aspects of EU law, or of any 
field of law for that matter, promote or pose a threat to the coherence of 
international law, unless the point of departure is that these fields are 
actually embedded in the same legal system.  
 
Both the EU Treaties and the case-law of the CJEU show a high degree of 
deference for international law. Article 216(2) TFEU expressly recognises 
the binding character of international agreements concluded by the Union 
and Article 3(5) TEU stipulates that the Union shall contribute to 'the 
strict observance and development of international law.' The CJEU has 
consistently held that international agreements binding on the EU form an 
integral part of the Union legal order and are, thus, directly applicable.10 
Furthermore, in its practice, the Court frequently has recourse to 
international law, for example in order to establish the international law 
meaning of terms referred to by EU rules.11 As far as customary 
international law is concerned, the Court has expressly acknowledged its 
binding force as a source of EU law.12 It also merits attention that the EU 
participated in the ILC's effort to elaborate a unified set of rules 
concerning the responsibility of international organisations, which 
culminated in the 2011 Draft Articles on the responsibility of international 
organisations13 and is actively contributing to the Commission's current 
attempt to shape a common understanding of the process of identifying 
customary international law.14 In this light, it is evident that EU law is by 
                                                
10 CJEU, Case 181/73 R & V Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR I-449, para 5. For an 
overview of the relevant case-law see generally Jan Wouters, Andre Nollkaemper, 
Erika De Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International 
Law in the EU and its Member States (T.M.C. Asser Press 2008).  
11 See for example ECJ, Case C-63/09 Axel Walz v Clickair SA [2010] ECR I- 4239, 
para 27. Here the Court referred to the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts prepared by the ILC in order to ascertain the concept 
of 'damage' provided for in the 1999 Montreal Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules for International carriage by Air. See also Christina Eckes, 
'International Law as Law of the EU: The Role of the European Court of Justice', in 
Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti, Ramses Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of 
the European Union (Brill 2012), 353-377.  
12 See for example ECJ, Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH &Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz 
[1998] ECR I-3655, para 46. For a recent confirmation of this principle, see also ECJ, 
Case C-366/10  (n 5), para 101. See also Allan Rosas, 'The European Court of Justice 
and Public International Law' in Jan Wouters, Andre Nollkaemper, Erika De Wet 
(eds), The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU 
and its Member States (T.M.C. Asser Press 2008)., 80; Alessandra Gianelli, 'Customary 
International Law in the European Union' in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti 
Paolo, Ramses Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Brill 
2012),  95-98.  
13 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations with 
commentaries, adopted by the ILC in its 63rd session (2011), Yrbk of the ILC 2011, Vol 
II.  
14 See for example the statement made by the delegation of the EU to the UN at the 
Sixth Committee on the topic of identification of customary international law, 
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no means 'clinically isolated' from general international law: both the 
Treaties and the Court expressly acknowledge international law as an 
integral part of the EU legal order. This proposition tallies with the 
findings of the ILC in its report on fragmentation. Having examined a 
number of so-called 'self-contained' regimes the Commission concluded 
that 'none of the treaty-regimes in existence today is self-contained in the 
sense that the application of general international law would be generally 
excluded.' 15  
 
Secondly, a perusal of the literature on the topic readily shows that a 
number of distinct legal issues (such as the question of fragmentation of 
international law, the question of the ranking of international law within 
the EU legal order, as well as the question of direct effects of international 
law within the EU legal order) are indiscriminately 'thrown into the 
crucible' in order to buttress arguments about the (allegedly) 
irreconcilable, systemic differences between EU and international law.16 
Although this contribution focuses on fragmentation, a few words need to 
be mentioned at this juncture regarding this 'crucible approach' often 
encountered in theory. It goes without saying that any objective 
assessment of the interplay between any two given legal orders necessitates 
that distinct legal questions are not conflated. While the extent to which 
international law is given direct effects and its ranking within the EU legal 
order may indeed serve as indicia of the degree of openness of EU law to 
international law, they may not serve as indicia of the existence of any systemic 
differences between the two legal orders. International law does not regulate its 
own status within the EU legal order, in the same way that it does not 
regulate its own status within the legal orders of States or of international 
organisations.17 Traditionally, questions of incorporation and of direct 
effect of international obligations have been regarded as an internal affair; 
international law being mainly concerned with the result, namely with the 
question as to whether or not there has been a breach of an international 
law obligation in a specific case.18 This much can be deduced from Article 
27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19 (VCLT) and from 
                                                                                                                                 
03/11/2014 http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15692_en.htm accessed on 31 
August 2015.  
15 ILC Report on Fragmentation  (n 8), para. 172.  
16 See for example, Jean D'Aspremont, Frédéric Dopagne, 'Two Constitutionalisms 
in Europe: Pursuing an Articulation of the European and International Legal Orders' 
(2008) ZaöRV 939, 947-950.  
17 Ramses Wessel, 'Reconsidering the Relationship Between International and EU 
Law: Towards a Content-Based Approach?' in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti , 
Ramses Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Brill 2012), 18.  
18 Eileen Denza, 'The Relationship Between International and National Law' in 
Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, OUP 2014), 416; James Crawford, 
Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn OUP 2012), 57-58.  
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23/05/1969 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-
English.pdf (accessed on 31 August 2015). According to art 27: 'A party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty.'  
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the case-law of the ICJ.20 The Court confirmed this position recently in 
the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case 
concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals: 'The Avena Judgment 
nowhere lays down or implies that the courts in the United States are 
required to give direct effect to paragraph 153(9) … Nor moreover does the 
Avena Judgment prevent direct enforceability of the obligation in 
question, if such an effect is permitted by domestic law.'21  
 
Finally, this introductory section shall conclude with a few general remarks 
on what – the present author at least believes – lies at the heart of the 
debate regarding the interface between the two legal orders, namely the 
(seemingly) irreconcilable tension between EU and international 
constitutionalism. Faced with the recent proliferation of actors, processes 
and normative outputs, a number of international lawyers have attempted 
to bring some method in the madness so to speak and retain the unity of 
international law by articulating and promoting constitutionalist 
approaches to international law.22 Although there are different (and often 
conflicting) accounts of international constitutionalism,23 mainstream 
international constitutionalist thinking assumes that certain universal 
values and principles exist and are shared by all sub-systems of 
international law – including EU law.24 This seems, on the face of it at 
least, to conflict with and undermine EU constitutionalism, namely the 
idea that the EU legal order is an autonomous constitutional legal order.25 
Without dwelling on the merits of the international constitutionalist 
thesis (something that would be well beyond the ambit of the present 
work), it needs to be stressed that, from an international law point of view, 
EU constitutionalism is not at variance with the systemic nature of 
international law. International law is a legal system – albeit a diffuse, 
horizontal one that allows its subjects to contract out of rules of general 
application and create functional sub-systems of law.26 Thus, the EU's 
                                                
20 See the case-law mentioned in Andre Nollkaemper, National Courts and the 
International Rule of Law (OUP 2011), 117 ff.  
21 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p 3, para 44 (emphasis 
added).  
22 Jan Klabbers, 'Setting the Scene' in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, Geir Ulfstein (eds), 
The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009), 18-19.  
23 For an overview see Christine Schwöbel, 'Organic Global Constitutionalism' (2010) 
LJIL 529, 533.  
24 Gráinne de Búrca, 'The European Court of Justice and the International Legal 
Order after Kadi' (2010) Harv. Int'l LJ 1, 38-40.  
25 D'Aspremont, Dopagne (n 16), 951. 
26 The 'autonomous' character of the legal orders created by the constituent 
instruments of international organisations was also acknowledged by the ICJ in the 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1996, 66. The Court stated that ' …the constituent instruments of 
international organizations are also treaties of a particular type; their object is to 
create new subjects of international law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which 
the parties entrust the task of realizing common goals.' ibid, para 19 (emphasis 
added).  
2015]                              Fragmentation and Inter-Judicial Dialogue       
 
28
claim to autonomy is not problematic to the unity of the system since it 
conforms to a fundamental rule thereof, namely the lex specialis rule.27 In 
the words of Crawford: '[T]he problems posed by self-contained regimes 
should not be exaggerated. If States wish to enter into comprehensive 
relationships that, in effect, contract out of the remainder of the law 
(peremptory norms aside) they are free to do so.'28  
 
The proposition that the autonomy of a particular sub-system does not 
pose any systemic threats to the whole international law edifice also finds 
support in the writings of international law constitutionalists. Thus, 
according to Peters, 'sector constitutionalization', namely the 
constitutionalist claims raised by different sub-systems, such as EU law, is 
no anomaly since 'the various processes of institutionalization on different 
levels do not exclude each other.'29 In this sense, there is nothing 
intrinsically incompatible with viewing the EU legal order both as an 
autonomous, constitutional order and as one embedded in the 
international legal system.30  
 
III. THE MULTIPLE SHADES OF FRAGMENTATION  
 
The previous section canvassed a few general remarks on the interplay 
between international and EU law. It was shown therein that the tensions 
that are often assumed to be inherent in the interface between the two 
legal orders are largely overstated. More particularly, it was proven that: a) 
far from being a self-contained regime, EU law is embedded in the 
international legal system to the extent that both the Treaties and the 
case-law of the CJEU explicitly refer to the applicability of international 
                                                
27 Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and The Universe: Self-Contained 
Regimes in International Law' (2006) EJIL 483, 500.  
28 James Crawford, 'Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law' (2013) 
Recueil des Cours 9, para 392.  
29 Anne Peters, 'Membership in the Global Constitutional Community' in Jan 
Klabbers, Anne Peters, Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(OUP 2009), 202.  
30 Such a proposition shows that, to a certain extent, the 'fragmentation' discourse is 
delusive. As Dirk Pulkowski aptly remarks: 'A more practical, hands-on approach 
would be to comprehend "unity" and "fragmentation" as discursive categories (rather 
than structural characteristics) of international law. Every legal argument, to be 
convincing needs to refer to the universal system while, at the same time, taking 
account of the particularity of the regime … Particularity and unity are, thus, topoi of 
international legal discourse that mutually depend on each other. Even in the world 
of legal argument, there is no universe without planets and no planet without 
universe … In strong regimes, the law of the universe serves as a source of legitimacy, 
while the rules of the planet provide the kind of operational effectiveness that 
advances the goals of the regime. In weak regimes, the rules of the planet often 
embody a superior legitimacy. In this case, lawyers reach out for the law of the 
universe to increase the effectiveness of the planetary rules.' Dirk Pulkowski, 
'Narratives of Fragmentation: International Law: International Law between Unity 
and Multiplicity' European Society of International Law (ESIL) Florence Agora 
Papers 2004 http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Pulkowski_0.PDF (accessed 
on 31 August 2015), 10. 
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law rules in the internal EU legal order; and b) that international law being 
a legal system that lacks vertical integration may very well accommodate 
the development of highly integrated sub-systems, such as EU law, without 
this endangering its unity. Against this background, this section 
endeavours to explore the phenomenon of fragmentation as one of the two 
key elements of the present framework of enquiry – the other being 
coherence. It will be shown that the phenomenon has both normative 
(normative fragmentation) and institutional aspects (substantive 
fragmentation). This section will further show that although the problems 
associated with normative fragmentation can be – to a great extent – 
resolved by the already existing mechanisms of norm-conflict provided 
under international law, the same does not hold true for substantive 
fragmentation. It will be argued that substantive fragmentation, which is 
here defined as the possibility of divergent interpretations by the plethora 
of international adjudicatory bodies interpreting and applying the same 
substantive law, poses a great risk to the unity of international law. The 
section will conclude by stressing the significance of adding the CJEU 
perspective to the on-going substantive fragmentation debate; a 
perspective that has hitherto remained largely unexplored.  
 
Although there is no consensus on an exact definition of 'fragmentation', 
the term is used in international legal parlance to describe two (inter-
connected) problems closely associated with the recent expansion and 
diversification of international law. In its normative aspect, fragmentation 
can be seen as the offshoot of the erosion of general international law 
through the 'splitting up of the law into highly specialised "boxes"' that 
claim relative autonomy from each other and from the general law.'31 This 
erosion carries the risk of the emergence of conflicting norms for the 
solution of the same legal issue (normative fragmentation).32 Normative 
                                                
31 ILC Report on Fragmentation,  (n 8), para 13.  
32 ibid, para 8; Larissa van den Herik, Carsten Stahn, ''Fragmentation', Diversification 
and '3D' Legal Pluralism: International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-Box' in 
Larissa van den Herik, Carsten Stahn Carsten (eds), The Diversification and 
Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (Brill 2012), 56; Gabriel Orellana Zabalza, 
The Principle of Systemic Integration: Towards a Coherent International Legal Order (Lit 
2012), 22. The ILC Report offers some characteristic examples of normative 
fragmentation. In the context of the celebrated Loizidou case, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) proclaimed that normal rules on reservations to treaties do 
not per se apply to human rights law. ILC Report (n 8), para 53; Loizidou v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 23 March 1995, ECHR Series A (1995) No. 310, p 29. Whereas the 
Loizidou case may be seen as an example of a conflict between general law and special 
law, normative fragmentation also encompasses cases of conflict between different 
types of special law. A classic instance of the latter category is the approach adopted 
by the Appellate Body of the WTO in the 1998 Beef Hormones case. In that case, the 
question arose as to the legal status of the 'precautionary principle' under WTO law. 
The Appellate Body opined that whatever the status of the principle under 
international environmental law, it had not become binding on the WTO. According 
to the ILC report, such an approach may suggest that 'environmental law' and 'trade 
law' may be governed by different principles. ILC Report (n 8), para 55; EC-Measures 
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fragmentation is a well-trodden topic: the ILC's voluminous study on 
fragmentation dealt with this very question33 and it has been also 
comprehensively treated in the literature.34 It suffices to note here that 
although this type of fragmentation often carries a negative connotation 
(as the first step to a dystopian nightmare of a legal order plunged into 
chaos), the final report of the Commission, as well as the final conclusions 
of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation35 offer a different account of 
normative fragmentation. The emergence of special treaty regimes, 
including environmental law, human rights law and EU law, is not 
accidental but seeks to respond to the emergence of new functional needs, 
such as the need to protect the environment, the need to protect the 
interests of individuals as well as the need for regional, economic 
integration.36 Such treaty regimes may deliberately create new rules 
designed to displace general rules or rules of other specialised regimes in 
order for them to be effective.37 However, it is important to note that 
'such deviations do not emerge as legal-technical 'mistakes'. They reflect 
the differing pursuits and preferences of actors in a pluralistic (global) 
society. A law that would fail to articulate the experienced differences 
between the interests or values that appear relevant in particular situations 
or problem areas would seem altogether unacceptable.'38 In this sense, 
normative fragmentation is to a certain extent inevitable: this type of 
fragmentation accounts for the expansion of international law into new 
areas in order to satisfy new needs.39 At the same time, the ensuing 
problem of norm-collision is not insoluble. International law offers a 
toolbox of 'conflict-avoidance devices' in order to reach a workable 
solution, including rules of priority, such as rules of hierarchy (jus cogens), of 
specialty (lex specialis) and of temporality (lex posterior), as well as the 
principle of systemic integration (set out in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT).40  
 
Renowned international lawyers, such as Simma41 and Crawford,42 have 
also espoused the Commission's sober and pragmatic approach to 
                                                                                                                                 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 13 February 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, paras 123-125.  
33 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 8), para 13.  
34 See for example Ralf Michaels, Joost Pauwelyn, 'Conflict of Norms or Conflict of 
Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law' (2012) Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 349; Wessel  (n 17).  
35 Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Yrbk. of the ILC 2006, Vol II.  
36 ibid, para 10  
37 ibid. 
38 ibid, para 11. 
39 Martti Koskenniemi, Päivi Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) LJIL 553, 560.  
40 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 8), paras 46-222, 324-449; see also generally Joost 
Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law (CUP 2003).  
41 See generally Bruno Simma, 'Universality of International Law from the 
Perspective of a Practitioner' (2009) EJIL 265.  
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normative fragmentation. Both Simma and Crawford perceive this type of 
fragmentation as the natural corollary of a decentralised and horizontal 
legal order and find the international law mechanisms in place to deal with 
its ramifications sufficient.43 As Crawford notes: 'Given that international 
law grew from bilateral relationships, it is difficult to see how anything has 
become more fragmented than it was at the beginning: it has just become 
more diverse. Multilateralism never meant complete coherence of treaty 
practice or State interest. If States are free to join multilateral treaties, 
they are free to create a partly fragmented system.'44 As far as EU law is 
concerned, there is voluminous writing concerning the role of the EU in 
the normative fragmentation of international law,45 and space limitations 
do not allow an in-depth exposition of the topic. It suffices to mention 
here that the lex specialis nature of EU law to general international law, as 
well as the principle of consistent interpretation, create a workable 
framework for the solution of norm conflicts between EU law and general 
international law on the one hand, and between EU law and other special 
regimes on the other.46 
 
While normative fragmentation may be viewed as a pathology of the 
international legal system, and while the system may also provide adequate 
normative tools to cope with the challenges set thereby, the institutional 
aspect of the phenomenon is more worrisome. In its institutional aspect, 
the term is used to describe the ramifications of the recent proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals.47 The recent expansion and 
diversification of international law have also fostered the mushrooming of 
new international courts and tribunals. This mushrooming coupled with 
the lack of any structural co-operation – let alone hierarchy – among the 
different judicial fora carry the risk of divergent (but 'equally authoritative') 
                                                                                                                                 
42 Crawford (n 28).  
43 ibid, paras 303-309; Simma (n 41), 270-277. 
44 Crawford (n 28), para 394. 
45 See for example Tomer Brouder, Yuval Shany (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms 
in International Law (Hart Publishing 2011); Karel Wellens, 'Diversity in Secondary 
Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Reflections on Current Trends' in 
Lambertus Barnhoorn, Karel Wellens (eds), Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity 
of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1995), 3-38; Leigh Hancher, 'Constitutionalism, 
the Community Court and International Law' in Lambertus Barnhoorn, Karel 
Wellens (eds), Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1995), 259-298; Brunno De Witte, 'Rules of Change in International Law: 
How Special is the European Community' in Lambertus Barnhoorn, Karel Wellens 
(eds), Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
1995), 299-234; Jonathan Charney, 'Is International Law Threatened by Multiple 
International Tribunals?' (1998) Recueil des Cours 101-382.  
46 Allan Rosas, 'International Responsibility of the EU and the European Court of 
Justice' in Panos Koutrakos, Malcolm Evans (eds), The International Responsibility of 
the European Union (Hart Publishing 2013), 147-151. On the principle of consistent 
interpretation of EU law in the light of international law binding on the EU, see ECJ, 
case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, para 5; see also Bart van 
Vooren, Ramses Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (CUP 
2014), 238-239.  
47 ILC Report on Fragmentation (n 8), paras 8, 13.  
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interpretations of international law (substantive fragmentation).48 Two 
successive Presidents of the ICJ, Judge Schwebel49 and Judge Guillaume,50 
as well as Judge Rosas of the CJEU51 have warned against the dangers of 
conflicting interpretations of international law. Similarly, a number of 
eminent lawyers, such as Higgins52 and Charney,53 have been vocal about 
the (very real) threat posed by substantive fragmentation. And with good 
reason: the famous collision between the ICJ in Nicaragua54 and the ICTY 
in Tadic55 over the question of the degree of control necessary for the 
attribution of conduct to a State by paramilitary forces present in another 
proves that the prospect of conflicting interpretations is not a remote 
one.56 While judges, lawyers and the ILC57 have stressed the danger of 
substantive fragmentation, the manifestation of the phenomenon in the 
interplay between EU and international law remains under-researched. 
Thus, there is very little literature on whether the CJEU diverges from the 
                                                
48 Crawford (n 28), para 357; Philippa Webb, International Judicial Integration and 
Fragmentation (OUP 2013), 6; Note that some commentators use different 
terminology to describe the phenomenon referred to here as 'substantive 
fragmentation'. For example, Webb uses the term 'judicial fragmentation'; see also 
generally Tullio Treves, 'Fragmentation of International Law: The Judicial 
Perspective' (2007) Comunicazioni e Studi 821; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'The Danger of 
Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the 
International Court of Justice' (1999) NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 
791. 
49 Statement by Judge S. M. Schwebel, President of the ICJ, to the Plenary Session of 
the UN General Assembly, 26/10/1999 http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=87&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1 (accessed on 31 August 2015). 
50 Statement by Judge G. Guillaume, President of the ICJ, to the UN General 
Assembly, 26/10/2000 http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=84&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1 (accessed on 31 August 2015). 
51 Allan Rosas, 'Methods of Interpretation – Judicial Dialogue' in Carl Baudenbacher, 
Erhard Busek (eds), The Role of International Courts (German Law Publishers 2008), 
187-188.  
52 Rosalyn Higgins, 'A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench' (2006) 
ICLQ 791, 794.  
53 Jonathan Charney, 'The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth 
of International Courts and Tribunals' (1999) NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics 697, 699.  
54 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14, pp 64-65. In that case the ICJ articulated the 
'effective control test' for attributing conduct of private individuals to a State. It is 
noteworthy that the Court affirmed the validity of this test in the 2007 Bosnian 
Genocide case. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
crime of Genocide, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p 43, p 410.  
55 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, 
paras 94 ff. By way of contrast to the 'effective control' test adopted by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua, the ICTY adopted, in that case, the much broader 'overall control' test.  
56 For a commentary, see Antonio Cassese, 'The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited 
in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia' (2007) EJIL 649.  
57 Note however that, although the ILC stressed the significance of 'substantive 
fragmentation', this type of fragmentation was excluded from the ambit of the 
Commission's work, thus making the question under consideration here all the more 
important. ILC Report (n 8), para 13.  
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ICJ when faced with questions of international law. 58 Of course, this is, to 
some extent, to be expected: the primary task of the Court is the 
interpretation and application of EU law, and not of international law. 
However, the EU is nowadays, undoubtedly, a major international actor 
and a party to a multitude of international agreements. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, customary international law is making significant 
inroads into the case-law of the Court. The increased interface between 
EU and international law means that the potential for deviating practices 
is great. Thus, it would be very interesting to examine whether, and if so, 
to what extent, the CJEU is conducive to the fragmentation of 
international law through its case-law.  
 
IV. FROM FRAGMENTATION TO COHERENCE 
 
The previous section sketched out the fragmentation problematique and 
placed the research question dealt with in this article within this broader 
frame of reference. However, before examining whether the CJEU's 
practice contributes to the substantive fragmentation of international law, 
it is important, at this point, to establish the usefulness of such an 
undertaking. In other words, why does it matter whether or not the CJEU 
plays a role in the fragmentation of the international legal order? Are such 
inquires merely an academic exercise or are there any significant practical 
implications thereof? According to the ILC, attempts to grasp the 
phenomenon of fragmentation in its multiple manifestations are important 
since it 'puts to question the coherence of international law.'59 Coherence is 
a desideratum and a standard towards which all legal systems strive – albeit 
its essence remains rather abstract.60  
 
It is noteworthy that, although the concept has, undoubtedly, great 
epistemic force (as a number of coherence theories of knowledge, truth 
and ethics have been developed in recent years) no precise or all-
encompassing definition may be found in the literature.61 Rather, it seems 
that 'coherence' connotes a basic, human desire for intelligibility, for 
things to fit together and make sense62 that can take many forms and thus, 
have many different definitions, according to the type of 'unintelligibility' 
one is faced with. In this light, it is asserted that, in the case at hand, much 
                                                
58 A notable exception in this respect is the work of Judge Rosas, an avid supporter of 
judicial dialogue, see (n 51). 
59 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 8), para 491 (emphasis added).  
60 ibid. 
61 See generally Kenneth Kress, 'Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: 
Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity and the Linear Order of Decisions' (1984) 
Cal. L. Rev. 369.  
62 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(Clarendon Press 1994), 280; Jeremy Waldron, 'The Concept and the Rule of Law', 
New York University School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series Working Paper, No. 08-50 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273005 (accessed on 31 August 
2015), 35.  
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depends on the type of fragmentation one wishes to tackle. 'Coherence' in 
the context of normative fragmentation differs from 'coherence' in the 
context of substantive fragmentation. As mentioned above, normative 
fragmentation refers to situations of norm-conflict, i.e. of having two valid 
and applicable norms that suggest incompatible solutions so that a choice 
must be made between them. In this scenario, retaining the coherence of 
the international legal system can be understood as finding a way to 'ensure 
… or enhance … the consistency of the rules of international law … and 
contribute … to avoiding conflicts between the relevant rules.'63 The work 
of the ILC on fragmentation was exactly aimed at tackling such 
inconsistencies by providing guidelines for making a choice between 
conflicting norms and for justifying having recourse to one norm instead of 
another. However, although the abovementioned conflict solution 
techniques identified by the Commission may help to resolve normative 
conflicts, there is no guarantee that their application may equally avert 
conflicting interpretations of international law. Indeed, the lack of a final 
court of appeal at the international level means that different adjudicative 
bodies are largely free to give their own rendition of international law and 
thus, come to inconsistent interpretations thereof. Consequently, answers 
to the question of coherence in the context of substantive fragmentation 
must be sought elsewhere.  
 
International lawyers who have extensively dealt with the phenomenon of 
substantive fragmentation, such as Charney and Webb, have linked 
coherence in this context to consistency in legal reasoning. Thus, 
according to Webb, adjudicative coherence 'requires that similar factual 
scenarios and similar legal issues are treated in a consistent manner, and 
that any disparity in treatment is explained and justified. The desired 
outcome is harmony and compatibility, which allow for the co-existence of 
minor variations and of tailoring of solutions for particular cases'64 
Similarly, in his 1998 Hague Lectures, Charney found that the question of 
coherence in international adjudication amounted to exploring whether, 
despite minor variations, international courts are engaged in the same 
dialectic and render decisions that are largely compatible.65  
 
The proposition that coherence, in this context, is synonymous with an 
integrated approach to legal reasoning also finds support in legal 
philosophy. According to Dworkin, one of the most influential writers on 
coherence in law, considerations of fairness require that that like cases 
must be treated alike and, as such, adjudicative coherence is a principle of 
formal justice, as well as of good adjudication.66 In a similar vein, Waldron 
                                                
63 EC- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 7 February 
2006, WT/DS291-293/INTERIM, p 299, para 7.68.  
64 Webb (n 48), 5.  
65 Charney (n 45), 137.  
66 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Fontana Press 1986), 165-167. See also Neil 
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press 1994), 103; Joseph 
Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (2nd edn, Princeton University Press 1990), 123-148.  
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describes coherence in law as something akin to a 'requirement of 
consistency: people must not be confronted by the law with contradictory 
demands … Beyond that, there is a felt requirement essential to law that its 
norms make some sort of sense in relation to another, … we should 
interpret them so that the point of one is not defeated by the point of 
another.'67 
 
There are a number of reasons underpinning the need for judicial 
integration. One of the main aims of international law is to promote 
stability and predictability in international relations.68 This aim cannot be 
achieved unless international courts stay within known patterns and 
deviate therefrom only with a sound justification.69 Moreover, in a 
decentralised legal order with weak enforcement mechanisms much 
depends on the willingness of its subjects to comply with the obligations 
they assume. Significant variations in the interpretation of general 
international law may threaten the legitimacy of the rules of the system. 
This, in turn, threatens and undermines the confidence placed by States in 
the way international law is applied.70 Therefore, retaining the uniformity 
of law at the international level seems to be more important, than in 
national legal systems with their strong enforcement mechanisms.71 More 
importantly, adjudicative coherence fulfils the abovementioned human 
desire for intelligibility. As each new ruling takes its place in the existing 
system, the whole system becomes fathomable to our intelligence, thereby 
enticing compliance.72 As Waldron aptly notes: 'Above all, law's 
systematicity affects the way that law presents itself to those it governs. It 
means that law can present itself as a unified enterprise of governance that 
one can make sense of … In this way, the law pays respect to the persons 
who live under it, conceiving them now as bearers of individual reason and 
intelligence.'73 
 
Judicial dialogue, namely receptiveness to and visible engagement with the 
case-law of other courts,74 is undoubtedly an important parameter of 
                                                
67 Waldron (n 62), 35.  
68 Thomas Grant, 'A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in Light 
of International Law' (1998) FYIL, 231.  
69 Christoph Schreuer, Matthew Weiniger, 'A Doctrine of Precedent?' in Peter 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (OUP 2008), 1189.  
70 Webb (n 48), 7; Charney (n 45), 360.  
71 Charney (n 45), 134.  
72 Waldron (n 62), 35.  
73 ibid, 37.  
74 Francis Jacobs, 'Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: 
The European Court of Justice' (2003) Tex. Int'l L. J. 547, 553, 556; Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, 'Judicial Dialogue as A Means of Interpretation', Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 71/2014 
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adjudicative coherence. It has also become a sort of leitmotif for ICJ 
judges. According to Judge Schwebel, 'judges themselves must realize the 
danger of fragmentation in the law, and even conflicts of case-law, born of 
the proliferation of courts. A dialogue among judicial bodies is crucial.'75 In 
the same vein, Judge Guillame stressed that, in order to combat 
fragmentation, international judges 'must inform themselves more fully of 
the case-law developed by their colleagues, conduct more sustained 
relationships with other courts, in a word, engage in constant inter-judicial 
dialogue.'76 In his Declaration in Diallo, Judge Greenwood opined that 
'[i]nternational law is not a series of fragmented specialist and self-
contained bodies of law, … it is a single, unified system of law and each 
international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other 
courts and tribunals.'77 
 
Transnational judicial communication may take different forms. From the 
different taxonomies to be found in the literature,78 three main categories 
may be discerned. First, courts may engage in vertical judicial dialogue. 
This form of communication refers to the jurisprudential interaction 
between supranational or national courts within the context of a formal, 
hierarchical system.79 For instance, the interaction between national courts 
(e.g. between the court of first instance, the court of appeals and the 
supreme court) and between international courts in an institutionalised 
hierarchical relationship (e.g. within the EU: the Court of Justice, the 
General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal) would fall within this 
category. Secondly, trans-judicial communication may take place between 
courts that operate at the same level, or have, more or less, the same status 
(horizontal judicial dialogue).80 Bodies that engage in horizontal dialogue 
may belong to the same regime (e.g. two national courts of appeal), or they 
may belong to different judicial systems (e.g. national courts in different 
countries).81 Finally, and more importantly for our purposes, judicial 
                                                
75 Statement by Judge Schwebel (n 49).  
76 Statement by Judge Guillaume (n 50). 
77 Declaration by Judge Greenwood in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, ICJ Reports 2012, p 391, 
para 8. See also Rosalyn Higgins, 'The ICJ and the ECJ: Two Courts in Europe' 
(2003) ICLQ 1.  
78 Allan Rosas, 'The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of 
Judicial Dialogue' (2007) EJLS 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'A Typology of Transjudicial 
Communication' (1994) U. Rich. L. Rev. 99. On grounds of completeness, it needs to 
be mentioned that Slaughter has identified a further category of judicial dialogue. 
Mixed vertical-horizontal communication occurs when a supranational body, such as 
the ECtHR, serves as a conduit for the dissemination of national legal practices. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, ibid, 111-112. Apart from the categories mentioned here, Rosas 
has also identified two further categories of trans-judicial communication. One 
category concerns the special relationship which exists between the CJEU and 
national courts when the latter are faced with problems of interpretation or validity 
of EU law, while the other concerns situations of overlapping jurisdiction between 
two international courts. Allan Rosas, ibid, 6, 12.  
79 Rosas (n 78), 6; Slaughter (n78),  106-107.  
80 Rosas (n 78), 13; Slaughter (n 78), 103-105. 
81 Rosas (n 78); Slaughter (n 78). 
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dialogue may concern the interaction between a judicial body called upon 
to apply a certain set of international rules and the dispute settlement 
mechanism specifically designed to interpret these rules (semi-vertical 
judicial dialogue).82 This type of dialogue is evidenced by direct citation to 
the case-law of the main interpreter as the latter constitutes persuasive 
authority.83 The relationship between the CJEU on the one hand and the 
ECtHR, the EFTA Court and the ICJ, on the other, are examples of this 
type of dialogue. Of course, the CJEU is not formally bound by 'external' 
case-law. However, as Rosas aptly notes, 'it makes sense to follow, or at 
least be inspired of, what this other dispute settlement mechanism is 
producing'84 – especially, since these courts have been specifically set up to 
interpret the international rules that the EU has committed itself to 
applying.  
 
To sum up, this section explored another key element of the 
fragmentation debate, namely the notion of coherence. It was shown that 
coherence lends itself to different interpretations and its exact definition 
varies according to the context within which it is used. The section 
continued by arguing that, within the context of substantive 
fragmentation, coherence is associated with consistency in the legal 
reasoning across different courts and tribunals, namely with treating 
similar legal issues in a consistent manner. Judicial dialogue, that is 
engagement with the jurisprudence of other international judicial bodies, 
was identified as an important factor contributing to adjudicative 
coherence. The section briefly introduced different categories of 
transnational judicial communication and concluded that, for the purposes 
of the present work, the semi-vertical dialogue between the CJEU and the 
ICJ is of particular importance. In the section to follow, the article will 
examine the question whether the CJEU is conducive to the 
fragmentation, or, conversely, to the coherence of the international legal 
order, by examining the extent of judicial dialogue between the two courts 
as evidenced by the direct citation of ICJ judgments by the CJEU.  
 
V. THE CJEU AND THE ICJ AT THE INTERFACE: PATTERNS OF 
JUDICIAL DIALOGUE 
 
A survey of the ever-burgeoning CJEU jurisprudence reveals that the EU 
courts, when faced with questions of international law, show a high degree 
of deference to the case-law of the ICJ and use it as an authoritative 
interpretation of international norms that are of relevance to their work. 
This is especially the case when they are faced with questions of customary 
international law – chiefly relating to international law of the sea and to 
                                                
82 Allan Rosas (n 78), 8.  
83 Slaughter (n 78), 124-125. On the concept of 'persuasive authority' see Patrick 
Glenn, 'Persuasive Authority' (1987) McGill L. J.  261, 294.  
84 Rosas (n 51), 190. See also Christina Eckes, 'The Court of Justice's Participation in 
Judicial Discourse: Theory and Practice' in Marise Cremona, Anne Thies (eds), The 
European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart 
Publishing 2013),185-188.  
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international treaty law.85 In Poulsen, the Court relied on a number of ICJ 
judgments in order to establish that certain provisions of the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea reflect customary international law. According to the Court:  
 
In this connexion, account must be taken of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1958 … in so far as they codify general rules 
recognized by international custom, and also of the United 
Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea … 
It has not entered into force, but many of its provisions are 
considered to express the current state of customary international 
maritime law (see judgments of the International Court of Justice 
in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Region Case, Canada v United States of America, ICJ 
[1984], p. 294, paragraph 94; Continental Shelf Case, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v Malta, ICJ [1985], p. 30, paragraph 27; Military and 
Paramilitary Activity  in and against Nicaragua Case, Nicaragua v 
United States of America, substantive issues, ICJ [1986], p. 111-112, 
paragraphs 212 and 214.86 
 
Similarly in Weber, the Court expressly referred to the North Sea Continental 
Shelf judgment in order to establish the legal regime applicable to the 
continental shelf; a question of international law that was relevant for 
determining whether work carried out in the continental shelf area is to be 
regarded as work carried out in the territory of a Member State. The 
Court stressed that: 
 
[T]he International Court of Justice has ruled that the rights of 
the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf 
constituting a natural prolongation of its land territory under the 
sea exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue of the State's sovereignty 
over the land and by extension of that sovereignty in the form of 
the exercise of sovereign rights for the purposes of the exploration 
of the seabed and the exploitation of its natural resources 
(judgment of 20 February 1969 in the so-called North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, Reports, 1969, p. 3, paragraph 19).87 
 
More recently, in the Salemnik case, the question of the applicability of EU 
law to an individual working on a platform on the continental shelf of a 
                                                
85 For earlier, detailed accounts of the extent of trans-judicial communication 
between the CJEU and the ICJ, see Allan Rosas, 'With a Little Help From My 
Friends: International Case-Law as a Source of Reference for the EU Courts' (2005) 
The Global Community Yrbk. of International Law & Jurisprudence 203; Higgins (n 
77).  
86 CJEU, Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndingheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Corp. 
[1992] ECR I-6048, para 10.  
87 CJEU, Case C-37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd. [2002] ECR I-
2032, para 34.  
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Member State was raised again before the Court.88 The ECJ relied on the 
passage from the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment quoted above89 in 
order to prove that a Member State has sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf adjacent to it and that, therefore, work carried out on 
installations on the continental shelf is to be regarded as work carried out 
in the territory of that State for the purposes of applying EU law.90 
 
Another area of customary international law where the CJEU has sought 
the guidance of the ICJ is that of treaty law. It is noteworthy that this field 
of law is of particular importance to the EU since the Union is not a party 
to the 1969 or 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties.91 In Opel 
Austria the General Court was faced, inter alia, with the question as to 
whether a regulation that introduced customs duties to car gearboxes 
produced in Austria and which was issued a few days before the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) came into force was 
compatible with the Agreement.92 The applicant argued that the adoption 
of the regulation infringed the public international law principle of good 
faith.93 The Court observed that 'the principle of good faith is a rule of 
customary international law recognized by the International Court of 
Justice (see the judgment of 25 May 1926, German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia, CPJI, Series A, No. 7, pp. 30 and 39)',94 before concluding that '… 
the principle of good faith is the corollary in public international law of the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectations which … forms part of 
the Community legal order'95 and on which 'any economic operator to 
whom an institution has given justified hopes may rely.'96 
 
The international law principles of good faith and of the protection of 
legitimate expectations were also central to the 2004 dispute between 
Greece and the Commission.97 The dispute concerned an agreement 
between the Commission and several Member States, including Greece, on 
the sharing of costs relating to the housing of representations in the 
Commission's offices in Abuja, Nigeria.98 Having decided that Greece had 
not paid its share of the costs according to the agreement, the 
                                                
88 CJEU, Case C-347/10, A. Salemnik v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut 
werkenemersverzekeringen [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:17, paras 13-27.  
89 ibid, para 32.  
90 ibid, paras 33-35.  
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92 General Court, Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union 
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93 ibid, para 89.  
94 ibid, para 90. 
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96 ibid. 
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[2007] ECR II-66.  
98 ibid, paras 7-44.  
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Commission, in 2004, proceeded to recovery by offsetting the relevant 
sums.99 Greece brought an action for annulment against the act of 
offsetting and argued, inter alia, that it was not bound by the agreement in 
question since it had not ratified it.100 The Court, however, ruled that, not 
only the act of ratification, but also Greece's conduct and more 
particularly the expectations that its conduct led others to entertain were 
relevant in assessing the case at bar.101 In that regard, the Court relied, 
once more, on the principles of good faith and of the protection of 
legitimate expectations. The Court repeated almost verbatim the 
abovementioned passage from the Opel Austria case and cited the German 
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case in order to substantiate the finding that 
the principles of good faith and of the protection of legitimate 
expectations form part of customary international law.102 On this basis, the 
Court concluded that Greece's conduct had raised legitimate expectations 
to its partners, and thus, Greece was precluded from claiming that it had 
not accepted the financial obligations stipulated in the agreement.103  
 
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that, more recently, the international law 
principles of good faith and of the protection of legitimate expectations 
were invoked by the applicant in the context of the 2014 Eromu case.104 
The case concerned an action for annulment against a decision of the 
Commission declaring the State aid granted by Hungary on certain 
electricity generators illegal as incompatible with the common market.105 
The applicant, a Hungarian electricity generator, claimed that the 
Commission's decision infringed international law since it, allegedly, 
infringed the principle of good faith and the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectations.106 More particularly, the applicant submitted that 
it had a legitimate expectation that its investment would be protected by 
both the Commission and the Hungarian State.107 The Court confirmed 
that the principles invoked by the applicant are part of the customary 
international law that it is bound to apply citing both the ICJ and its own 
case-law.108 However, the Court found that there had been no 
infringement of the principles in question since the applicant had never 
received any assurance whatsoever that the State aid granted to it was 
compatible with the EU rules on State aid.109 
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In Racke the German Federal Finance Court referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling a question concerning the validity of a regulation 
suspending certain trade concessions provided for by the Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
Yugoslavia.110 The Court was asked whether the unilateral suspension of 
the Agreement complied with the conditions for the termination and 
suspension of treaties on the ground of fundamental change of 
circumstances (rebus sic standibus).111 The Court tackled the question by first 
establishing, with reference to the case-law of the ICJ, that the rebus sic 
standibus clause is part of customary international law:  
 
By way of a preliminary observation, it should be noted that even 
though the Vienna Convention does not bind either the 
Community or all its Member States, a series of its provisions, 
including Article 62, reflect the rules of international law which lay 
down, subject to certain conditions, the principle that a change of 
circumstances may entail the lapse or suspension of a treaty. Thus 
the International Court of Justice held that '[t]his principle, and 
the conditions and exceptions to which it is subject, have been 
embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a 
codification of existing customary international law on the subject 
of termination of a treaty relationship on account of change of 
circumstances' (judgment of 2 February 1973, Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(United Kingdom v Iceland), ICJ Reports 1973, p. 3, paragraph 
36).112 
 
Having established the customary law status of the rebus sic standibus 
principle, the Court concluded that the EU was allowed to suspend the 
treaty concluded with Yugoslavia by reason of a fundamental change of 
circumstances.113 However, the Court was anxious to stress the exceptional 
character of the plea of fundamental change of circumstances in relation to 
the pacta sunt servanda principle; a fundamental principle of international 
law.114 Again, the exceptional character of the rebus sic standibus clause in 
relation to this principle was justified with reference to the jurisprudence 
of the World Court. According to the Court the importance of the pacta 
sunt servanda principle 'has been underlined by the International Court of 
Justice, which has held that 'the stability of treaty relations requires that 
the plea of fundamental change of circumstances be applied only in 
exceptional cases (judgment of 25 September 1997, Gabsikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v Slovakia), at paragraph 104…).'115 
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One of the latest instances in which the ECJ turned to ICJ caselaw as a 
shortcut to ensuring that a rule indeed reflects customary international law 
is the 2015 Evans case.116 The case concerned a request for a preliminary 
ruling on the applicability of Regulation 1408/71 on social security schemes 
to a national of a Member State employed at a consular post within the 
territory of another Member State.117 Since the case involved consular staff, 
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations118 was of relevance to 
the Court.119 In order to ascertain the customary law status, and hence, the 
applicability, of the 1963 Vienna Convention the Court referred to the 
Tehran Hostages case: 
 
As the Advocate General observed in point 52 of his Opinion, the 
idea of being 'subject to the legislation of a Member State', as 
referred to in Article 2 of regulation No 1408/71, ought to be 
interpreted in the light of the relevant rules of customary 
international law …, namely the Vienna Convention of 1963, which 
codifies the law of consular relations and states principles and rules 
essential for the maintenance of peaceful relations between States 
and accepted throughout the world by nations of all creeds, 
cultures and political complexions (see judgment of the 
International Court of Justice of 24 May 1980, case concerning the 
diplomatic and consular staff of the United States of America in 
Tehran (United States v. Iran), Reports of Judgements, Advisory 
Opinions and Orders 1980, p. 3, paragraph 45).120 
 
A case where one of the parties relied on the case-law of the ICJ, but this 
was rejected by the EU Courts was Anastasiou.121 Here, the Commission 
argued that the de facto acceptance of certificates of products issued by the 
authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) did not 
amount to recognition of the entity in question as a State.122 The 
Commission based its argument on the Namibia Advisory Opinion.123 This 
claim was rejected by the ECJ which was quick to point out that the legal 
and factual situation of Cyprus and that of Namibia were radically 
different and thus, not comparable. 
 
In addition, as regards the interpretation which the Commission 
draws from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
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Justice on Namibia, …, and which is said to have influenced its 
Application of the Association Agreement, suffice it to say, …, 
that the special situation of Namibia and that of Cyprus are not 
comparable from either the legal or the factual point of view. 
Consequently, no interpretation can be based on an analogy 
between them.124 
  
The celebrated Kadi judgments125 relating to sanctions against terrorist 
activities also prompted references to ICJ jurisprudence. The facts 
underpinning the dispute are well known and thus, they will not be 
recounted here. It is important to note, however, that citations to the 
case-law of the World Court abound in the passages of the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) judgment discussing the question of the primacy of the UN 
Charter and of SC decisions over other international agreements:  
 
As regards, second, the relationship between the Charter of the 
United Nations and international treaty law, that rule of primacy 
is expressly laid down in Article 103 of the Charter which provides 
that, '[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and 
their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.' In accordance 
with Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
and contrary to the rules usually applicable to successive treaties, 
that rule holds good in respect of Treaties made earlier as well as 
later than the Charter of the United Nations. According to the 
International Court of Justice, all regional, bilateral, and even 
multilateral, arrangements that the parties may have made must be 
made always subject to the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter 
of the United Nations (judgment of 26 November 1984, delivered 
in the case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ 
Reports 1984, p. 392, paragraph 107).126 
That primacy extends to decisions contained in a resolution of the 
Security Council, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, under which the members of the United 
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council. According to the International Court of Justice, in 
accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the 
Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any 
other international agreement (Order of 14 April 1992 (provisional 
measures), Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
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Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America), 
ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 16, paragraph 42, and Order of 14 April 1992 
(provisional measures), Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United 
Kingdom), ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 113, paragraph 39).127 
 
Moreover, the CFI quoted the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in its 
discussion of the content and scope of the notion of peremptory norms of 
international law (jus cogens):   
 
The indirect judicial review carried out by the Court in connection 
with an action for annulment of a Community act adopted, where 
no discretion whatsoever may be exercised, with a view to putting 
into effect a resolution of the Security Council may therefore, in 
some circumstances, extend to determining whether the superior 
rules of international law falling within the ambit of jus cogens have 
been observed, in particular, the mandatory provisions concerning 
the universal protection of human rights, from which neither the 
Member States nor the bodies of the United Nations may 
derogate because they constitute 'intransgressible principles of 
international customary law' (Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, The Legality of the 
Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Reports 1996, p. 226, 
paragraph 79).128 
 
References to the case-law of the ICJ are also to be found in the text of 
the LTTE judgment,129 one of the more recent cases involving counter-
terrorism measures. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
brought an action for annulment of the act under which they were added 
to the EU's list of terrorist organisations.130 One of the arguments made by 
LTTE was that, by placing it on the list in question, the EU breached the 
customary international law principle of non-intervention.131 The Court 
rejected this plea and argued, citing the Nicaragua case, that the principle 
only applies to sovereign States and not to other entities, including 
liberation movements:  
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As for LTTE's reference to the principle of non-interference 
which, in its opinion, the Council infringed by placing it on the list 
relating to frozen funds, it should be noted that that customary 
international law principle, also called the principle of non-
intervention, concerns the right of any sovereign State to conduct 
its affairs without external interference and constitutes a corollary 
of the the principle of sovereign equality of states (judgment of the 
International Court of Justice of 26 November 1984 in Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), on competence and admissibility, ICJ 
Reports 1984, p. 392, paragraph 73, and of 27 June 1986, on the 
substance, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 96, paragraph 202). As the Council 
points out, that principle of international law is set out for the 
benefit of sovereign States, and not for the benefit of groups or 
movements. Contrary to LTTE's submissions, the placing on the 
list relating to frozen funds of a movement – even if it is a 
liberation movement – in a situation of armed conflict with a 
sovereign State, on account of the involvement of that movement 
in terrorism, does not therefore constitute an infringement of the 
principle of non-interference.132 
 
Nevertheless, the Court annulled the contested act since it found that the 
Council had not followed the appropriate procedure under EU legislation 
on terrorist designations, which required a decision of a competent 
authority identifying the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.133  
 
This section attempted to illustrate the extent of judicial dialogue between 
the CJEU and the ICJ. The practice of the EU Courts explored herein 
shows that, when confronted with questions of public international law, 
the CJEU, rather than proffering its own interpretation of international 
law, has consistently chosen to defer to the authority of the ICJ. As a 
result, the CJEU has made extensive use of the latter's case-law as a tool 
for the interpretation of international law norms relevant for carrying out 
its tasks. This conclusion tallies with the observations made ten years ago 
by Judge Rosas. In his article tackling the same question dealt with here, 
Rosas found that '[w]hile the case-law of international courts and tribunals 
is not formally binding on the EU Courts, their practice seems to be based 
on the idea that it makes sense to take this case-law into account as much 
as possible, as the EU Courts are not necessarily well-equipped to 'know 
better' than the international dispute settlement bodies set up to apply 
and interpret public international law.'134  
 
Furthermore, it has been also demonstrated, that in the past decade, the 
EU Courts have shown greater openness to the jurisprudence of the ICJ. 
While in the past the CJEU sought the guidance of the ICJ mainly for the 
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purposes of ascertaining the customary international law status of norms 
pertaining to the law of the sea and to treaty law, recent practice shows 
that the EU Courts are making knowledgeable references to the case-law 
of the ICJ in order to settle a wider gamut of international law questions. 
These include: the question of the customary law status of the 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Consular relations; the question of the primacy of the UN 
Charter and of SC resolutions over other international agreements; 
questions of jus cogens; as well as questions relating to the scope and 
content of the principle of non-intervention.   
 
The increasingly frequent reliance on the jurisprudence of the ICJ proves 
that, contrary to the manner in which it is often portrayed in the 
literature, the CJEU is actually contributing to the coherence of the 
international legal system, as this term was defined above. Rather than 
making bold pronouncements on international law, the CJEU's reliance on 
existing jurisprudence guarantees that the risk of conflicting 
interpretations of international law norms is mitigated. Thus, the practice 
of the EU Courts goes a long way towards diminishing the risks of the 
substantive fragmentation of international law.135 
 
VI. THE CJEU AND THE COHERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER: TRANS-JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 
 
The previous section showed that the CJEU has gradually become more 
receptive to guidance by its sister court in The Hague in matters falling 
within the ambit of international law – as evidenced by the increasing 
number and scope of references to the ICJ's case-law. To the extent that 
direct citation to the jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals 
constitutes proof of 'inter-judicial dialogue' and thus, a factor contributing 
towards adjudicative coherence, it is safe to assume that the conclusions 
reached above hold true. At the same time, one may very well question 
whether the use of the term 'dialogue' in this context accurately reflects 
the current practice of the CJEU. Both in common parlance and in legal 
terminology, 'judicial dialogue' connotes some type of visible, active 
engagement with the case-law of other bodies.136 However, the previous 
exposition showed that the Court has shied away from delving too deeply 
into international law. It is noteworthy that, in none of the cases discussed 
above, did the Court take a proactive stance by exploring the relevant 
questions beyond the ICJ's dicta: it merely, unquestioningly deferred to the 
latter's authority. In this sense, the CJEU has proven, so far at least, a shy 
disciple, rather than an enquiring peer – a fact that somewhat diminishes 
the quality of judicial dialogue between the two courts.  
 
The Court's hesitation to engage in depth with ICJ jurisprudence, and 
with international law more generally, is evinced by its extremely cautious 
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handling of international law questions that are not as well-settled as the 
ones explored above. The 2014 Parliament and Commission v Council 
judgment137 is a case in point. The case concerned, amongst other things, 
the legal status of a Council Decision authorising Venezuelan fishing 
vessels to fish in EU waters off the coast of French Guiana on the 
condition that they comply with applicable EU law.138 Although all parties 
involved in the dispute conceded that the Decision was legally binding as a 
matter of international law, its exact legal status was unclear. While both 
the Parliament and the Spanish Government treated the Decision as a 
unilateral juridical act139 (i.e. an act of unilateral origin with binding effects 
in international law), France considered it as having culminated into the 
conclusion of an international agreement between the EU and Venezuela 
and the Council seemed to oscillate between these two positions.140 It 
needs to be pointed out that, from an international law point of view, the 
doctrine of unilateral juridical acts first propounded by the ICJ in the 
Nuclear Tests case141 remains somewhat elusive. According to the ICJ's 
judgment, unilateral declarations publicly made that manifest an intention 
to be bound may create legal obligations for their authors without any 
need of acceptance or reliance on behalf of the addressee.142 However, 
despite subsequent judgments of the Court confirming the validity of the 
principle enunciated in the Nuclear Tests case143 and a decade long study of 
the ILC on the topic,144 disagreement still reigns over the normative status 
of these instruments.145 The Opinion delivered by Advocate General 
Sharpston bears the hallmark of true inter-judicial dialogue. The Advocate 
General provided a rigorous analysis of the juridical character of both 
international agreements and unilateral acts in international law and 
critically examined both the relevant case-law of the ICJ and the work of 
the ILC before concluding that the Decision in question constituted in 
fact a unilateral juridical act.146 Unfortunately, the Court did not espouse 
the Advocate General's enthusiastic approach. Instead of examining 
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whether the Decision could be viewed as a unilateral act, it quickly came 
to the conclusion that it was a treaty – even in the absence of clear 
evidence of acceptance on behalf of Venezuela.147  
 
The fact that the CJEU is not quite at home when confronted with 
complex questions of public international law is further corroborated by 
its confusing stance on non-State actors. As seen above, the Court argued 
in LTTE that non-State entities, including national liberation movements, 
may not rely on the principle of non-intervention since it only applies to 
States. However, in Brita,148 a case that involved, inter alia, an agreement 
between the EC and PLO, the Court treated the agreement in question as 
a treaty within the meaning of article 2 of the 1969 VCLT without 
exploring whether, and if so, under which conditions, a non-state entity, 
such as the PLO, may enjoy treaty-making powers.149 Again, the question 
of the treaty-making capacity of non-State actors, other than international 
organisations, is fiercely debated in international legal literature150 and the 
hesitation of the Court to address it head-on is thus, understandable. Yet, 
the Court's occasional reluctance to actively engage with international law 
leaves something to be desired. While following closely the jurisprudence 
of the ICJ may help avert the risk of conflicting interpretations, the 
CJEU's lack of self-confidence as to its capabilities in international law 
also undermines the quality of inter-judicial dialogue between the two 
courts.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article demonstrated that the pluralisation of modern international 
relations has brought along the danger of the fragmentation of the 
international legal order by threatening its coherence. It has also been 
shown that 'fragmentation' and 'coherence' are multi-faceted concepts. 
They are used to describe a wide array of inter-related problems and goals 
and, therefore, any discussion involving these concepts needs to carefully 
differentiate among the various aspects thereof. More particularly, this 
contribution showed that substantive fragmentation, namely the danger of 
conflicting pronouncements on international law due to the recent 
proliferation of international courts and tribunals tasked with interpreting 
the same substantive law, poses a threat to adjudicative coherence, namely 
the need for consistency in judicial reasoning. It has been further shown 
that judicial dialogue, in the sense of active engagement with the 
jurisprudence of other courts, is an important factor in counteracting 
substantive fragmentation. The article examined the extent of judicial 
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dialogue between the CJEU and the ICJ by identifying whether and to 
what extent the former takes into account the jurisprudence of the latter – 
since the ICJ's judgments are persuasive authority in the field of 
international law. In this respect, it was proven that the EU Courts have 
shown a great degree of deference to the authority of the ICJ. Instead of 
advancing their own interpretation of international law, they have closely 
followed the guidance of the ICJ by making a number of direct references 
to the latter's rulings. It has been also demonstrated that the CJEU has 
increasingly shown greater willingness to open up to external sources. 
While initially the jurisprudence of the ICJ was mainly used to settle 
questions of customary international law relating to the law of the sea and 
to treaty law, in recent years, the Court has taken into account the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ in a number of other cases pertaining to 
international law. On this basis, it was concluded that the practice of the 
CJEU is conducive to the coherence of the international legal system. At 
the same time it was also pointed out that the pattern of inter-judicial 
dialogue between the two courts is occasionally frustrated by the CJEU's 
reluctance to go into uncharted territory and its tendency to follow closely 
the ICJ's pronouncements. While this tendency may minimise the risk of 
divergent interpretations, it somewhat diminishes the quality of inter-
judicial dialogue between the two courts. 
 
The overall conclusion reached here casts doubt on the commonly 
assumed view that the CJEU undermines the coherence of international 
law – which has gained prominence in the literature especially after the 
ECJ's pronouncement on the Kadi case. In the light of the present 
findings, it is submitted that this view is erroneous to the extent that it 
does not take into account all the parameters of coherence defined above. 
Traditionally, accounts of coherence in international legal theory examine 
whether the CJEU gives precedence to international law norms by 
invalidating conflicting EU legislation.151 However, as shown here, 
coherence is a complex notion: by limiting our enquiry to the traditional 
binary of validity/invalidity we ignore the increasing complexities faced by 
a court called upon to function in a setting where the global, regional and 
national directly intersect. Fragmentation and coherence debates may not 
discount the extent of judicial discourse and interaction among 
international dispute settlement bodies. For, as Higgins suggests, the best 
way to avoid the fragmentation of international law in practice is 'for us all 
to keep ourselves well informed. Thus the European Court of Justice will 
want to keep abreast of the case law of the International Court ... And the 
International Court will want to make sure it fully understands the 
circumstances in which these issues arise for its sister court in 
Luxembourg.'152
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